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Abstract: Disruption from service caused by DDoS attacks is an 
immense threat to Internet today. These attacks can disrupt the 
availability of Internet services completely, by eating either 
computational or communication resources through sheer volume of 
packets sent from distributed locations in a coordinated manner or 
graceful degradation of network performance by sending attack 
traffic at low rate. In this paper, we describe a novel framework that 
deals with the detection of variety of DDoS attacks by monitoring 
propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside ISP Domain and then 
characterizes flows that carry attack traffic. Two statistical metrics 
namely, Volume and Flow are used as parameters to detect DDoS 
attacks. Effectiveness of an anomaly based detection and 
characterization system highly depends on accuracy of threshold 
value settings. Inaccurate threshold values cause a large number of 
false positives and negatives. Therefore, in our scheme, Six-Sigma 
and varying tolerance factor methods are used to identify threshold 
values accurately and dynamically for various statistical metrics. 
NS-2 network simulator on Linux platform is used as simulation 
testbed to validate effectiveness of proposed approach. Different 
attack scenarios are implemented by varying total number of 
zombie machines and at different attack strengths. The comparison 
with volume-based approach clearly indicates the supremacy of our 
proposed system. 
 
Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Distributed Denial-of-Service 
(DDoS), False Positives, False Negatives, Network Security.  
 
1. Introduction 
Network security breaches represent a growing threat to 
businesses and institutions, costing them billions of dollars 
every year. According to statistics given by CERT [1], a 
mere 171 vulnerabilities were reported in 1995 that boomed 
to 7236 in 2007. Already, the number for the same has gone 
up to 4110 until the second quarter of 2008. Apart from 
these, a large number of vulnerabilities go unreported every 
year. In particular, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are a 
major threat to the Internet. CERT defines the term “Denial 
of Service” as follows [2]: 
 
-Occupancy of limited resource or difficult to renew such as 
network bandwidth, data structure or memory of a system. 
-Changeable or damage network data, for instance delete 
system configuration, shutdown web service. 
-Changeable or damage physical information, for example 
damage of electronic, network line. 
 
DoS attacks are commonly characterized as events where 
legitimate users or organizations are deprived of certain 
services like web, e-mail or network connectivity that they 
normally expect to have. Therefore, as given by Weiler [3] 
they attempt:  
1. To inhibit legitimate network traffic by flooding the 
network with useless traffic.  
2. To deny access to a service by disrupting 
connections between two parties.  
 3.    To block the access of a particular individual to a  
        service.  
4.    To disrupt the specific system or service itself.  
 
The main aim of such attacks is to prevent the victim either 
from the benefit of a particular service (in case of client 
being victim) or from providing its services to others (in case 
of server being victim). 
    DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks are 
amplified form of DoS attacks where attackers direct 
hundred or even more zombie machines against a single 
target. DDoS attacks have two phases [4]:  deployment and 
attack phase. DDoS program must be deployed on one or 
more compromised hosts before attacks are possible. Thus, 
mitigation of DDoS attacks requires defense mechanisms for 
both phases. Intruder can perform DDoS attacks either as 
brute force attacks or as logical attacks. In brute force DDoS 
attacks, as shown in figure 1, legitimate looking but error 
data packets are sent to victim as much as possible, thus 
reducing legitimate user’s bandwidth and preventing access 
to a service. Logical attacks exploit a specific feature or 
implementation bug of some protocol or application installed 
at the target machine in order to consume excess amount of 
its resources [4]. Series of DDoS attacks that shut down 
some high profile websites have demonstrated the severe 
consequences of these attacks [5]. A quantitative estimate of 
worldwide DoS attack frequency was found to be 12,000 
attacks over a three-week period in 2001 [6]. As per 
computer crime and security survey conducted by FBI/CSI in 
the United States for the year 2004 [7], DoS attacks are the 
second most widely detected outsider attack types in 
computer networks immediately after virus infections. A 
computer crime and security survey conducted in Australia 
for the year 2004 [8] shows similar results.  
    There exist few reasons, which make DDoS attacks 
inevitable. The Internet is designed to keep intermediate 
network as simple as possible to optimize it for packets 
forwarding. This pushes the complexity to the end hosts and 
causes one unfortunate implication. If one party in two-way 
communication misbehaves, it can result in arbitrary damage 
to its peer. No one in the intermediate network will step in 
and stop it because Internet is not designed to police traffic. 
Moreover, the Internet security is highly interdependent. At 
the maximum we can make victim secure with firewalls etc. 
but still the degree of its susceptibility to DDoS attacks 
depends on the position of security in the rest of the global 
Internet [9]. The limited availability of resources acts as 
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additional benefit for DDoS attackers. To add on, 
accountability is not enforced which lead to attacks 
comparable to reflector attacks [10] such as the Smurf 
attacks [11]. Thus there exists no way out to enforce global 
deployment of a particular security mechanism [9]. 
 
Internet
Legitimate User
Victim
Router
Zombie Machines
A1 A2 A3
Figure 1. Illustration of the DDoS attack scenario 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework that   
concentrates on detection and characterization of various 
kinds of DDoS attacks, e.g. low rate degrading, high rate 
disruptive and mixed rate, by monitoring the propagation of 
abrupt traffic changes inside ISP Domain. Two statistical 
metrics namely volume and flow are used as parameters to 
obtained normal traffic model of our system. Our proposed 
scheme inflicts an extremely high detection rate with low 
false alarm rate. Six-Sigma [12], [13] and varying tolerance 
factor methods are used to identify threshold values 
accurately and dynamically for various statistical metrics 
used in our scheme. Internet type topologies used for 
simulation are generated using Transit-Stub model of GT-
ITM [14] topology generator. NS-2 [15] network simulator 
on Linux platform is used as simulation testbed to test our 
proposed scheme. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 point out related work, section 3 describes our 
proposed approach in detail, and section 4 contains 
experimental design and performance analysis. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work. 
 
2. Related Work 
This section charts out the overview on a plethora of existing 
DDoS defense schemes proposed in the literature.   
    Various reviews have been given in [4], [9], [16]-[19] on 
DDoS attacks, and defense methods. Molsa et al.  [4] have 
described, what DoS attacks are, how they can be carried out 
in IP networks, and how one can defend against them. 
According to them, focus should not be to implement all 
possible defenses, instead, one should optimize the trade-off 
between security costs and acquired benefits in handling the 
most important risks. Mircovik et al. [9] outlined good 
directions for DDoS research by providing comprehensive 
taxonomies of attack and defense mechanisms. Moreover 
they critically brought forward weaknesses of various DDoS 
defense classes which are useful for future work in DDoS 
attacks field.  
    Peng et al. [16], have reviewed the state-of-attacks, 
compared the strengths and weaknesses of different defense 
proposals, and discussed potential countermeasures against 
each attack mechanism. They motivated and outlined an 
integrated solution to solve the problem of distributed denial 
of service attacks.  Xiang et al. [17] have described evolution 
and classification of DDoS attacks. They proposed a novel 
concept of active defense against DDoS attacks to mitigate 
the infamous DDoS attacks in the Internet. Douligeris et al. 
[18] have presented a structural approach to the DDoS 
problem by developing a classification of DDoS attacks and 
DDoS defense mechanisms. Chen et al. [19] have proposed a 
characterization of DDOS defenses where reaction points 
were network-based and attack responses were active. And 
they compared different attack detection algorithms on the 
basis of granularity of detection used, network information 
monitored, specific characteristics of attack traffic, source of 
false positives and limitations.  
    Exiting DDoS defense schemes are classified into four 
broad categories: Prevention, Detection, Response, and 
Tolerance and Mitigation. Attack prevention methods try to 
stop all well known signature based and broadcast based 
DDoS attacks from being launched in the first place or edge 
routers, keeps all the machines over Internet up to date with 
patches and fix security holes. The approaches to stop IP 
spoofing [20], filtering malicious IP addresses based on 
experience [21], Remove unused services [4] and repairing 
security holes by patches [22] fall under this category. Attack 
prevention schemes are not enough to stop DDoS attacks 
because these are always vulnerable to novel and mixed 
attack types for which signatures and patches do not exist in 
the databases. Therefore, these are considered forensic 
defense methods. Attack detection aims to detect an ongoing 
attack and to discriminate malicious traffic from legitimate 
traffic. Detection can be performed using database of known 
signatures, by recognizing anomalies in system behaviors or 
using third party. Signature based approach employs a priori 
knowledge of attack signatures. The signatures are manually 
constructed by security experts analyzing previous attacks 
and used to match with incoming traffic to detect intrusions. 
SNORT [23] and Bro [24] are the two widely used signature 
based detection approaches. Signature based techniques are 
only effective in detecting traffic of known DDoS attacks 
whereas new attacks or even slight variations of old attacks 
go unnoticed. Anomaly detection [25]-[31] relies on 
detecting behaviors that are abnormal with respect to some 
normal standard. Detecting DDoS attacks involves first 
knowing normal behavior of our system and then to find 
deviations from that behavior.  
    Gil and Poletto [25] proposed a scheme called MULTOPS 
to detect denial of service attacks by monitoring the packet 
rate in both the up and down links. MULTOPS assumes that 
packet rates between two hosts are proportional during 
normal operation. A significant disproportion between the 
packet rate going to and from a host or subnet is a strong 
indication of a DoS attack. Blazek et al. [26] proposed batch 
detection to detect DoS attacks by monitoring statistical 
changes. Cheng et al. [27] proposed to use spectral analysis 
to identify DoS attack flows.  Lee and Stolfo [28] used data 
mining techniques to discover patterns of system features 
that describe program and user behavior and implement a 
classifier that can recognize anomalies and intrusions. A 
mechanism called congestion triggered packet sampling and 
filtering is proposed by Huang et al. [29]. According to this 
approach, a subset of dropped packets due to congestion is 
selected for statistical analysis. If anomaly is indicated by the 
statistical results, a signal is sent to the router to filter the 
malicious packets. Mirkovic et al. [30] proposed D-WARD 
defense system that does DDoS attack detection at source, 
based on the idea that DDoS attacks should be stopped as 
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close to the source as possible. Bencsath et al. [31] have 
given a traffic level measurement based approach, in which 
incoming traffic is monitored continuously and dangerous 
traffic intensity rises are detected. Chen et al. [32] used 
distributed change-point detection (DCD) architecture using 
change aggregation trees (CAT) to detect DDoS attack over 
multiple network domains. Feinstein et al. [33] focus their 
detection efforts on activity level and source address 
distribution using entropy. Anomaly based techniques can 
detect novel attacks; however, it may result in higher false 
alarms. Mechanisms that deploy third-party detection do not 
handle the detection process themselves, but rely on an 
external third-party that signals the occurrence of the attack 
[9]. Examples of mechanisms that use third-party detection 
are easily found among traceback mechanisms [34], [35].  
 
Table 1 shows the comparison of various detection 
approaches i.e. pattern, anomaly and third party detection. 
We can see that NPSR and detection accuracy is high in 
pattern detection scheme compared to other. But it can be 
used only for known attacks detection. Effectiveness of third 
party detection schemes depends on detection approach used 
by third party. Therefore, anomaly based schemes are most 
efficient and effective to detect novel attacks. Because of the 
advantages and effectiveness over other approaches, we used 
anomaly based detection scheme. 
    The goal of the attack response is to relieve the impact of 
the attack on the victim while imposing minimal collateral 
damage to legitimate clients. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of various Detection Approaches 
 
The approaches to identify attack source/path or traceback 
[34], [35], filtering malicious traffic [36], and rate throttling 
malicious traffic [30], [37] fall under this category. Attack 
tolerance and mitigation focuses on minimizing the attack 
impact and tries to provide optimal level of service as per 
quality of its service requirement to legitimate users while 
service provider is under attack. The tolerance and mitigation 
solution includes router’s queue management [38], [39], 
router’s traffic scheduling [40], and target roaming [41].  
    Volume based approach (VBA) given by [31] is suitable 
for detection of high rate attack, but ineffective to detect low 
rate degrading attacks. To overcome this limitation, our 
scheme uses flow metric along with volume metric. 
 
3. Proposed Approach 
In this section, we discuss our proposed DDoS defense 
framework as shown in figure 2, which aims to provide the 
following features: (1) Detects variety of DDoS attacks while 
victim is being attacked, (2) identifies and tags attack flows 
in real time and (3) responds to identified attacks by either 
filtering or rate throttling according to strength of attacks.  
    In this paper, we will focus on successful detection of 
variety of DDoS attacks and characterization of malicious 
flows in real time. Six-Sigma method along with varying 
tolerance factor is used to identify threshold values correctly. 
 
3.1  Detection of Attacks 
After analyzing various existing DDoS defense techniques, 
we find that major challenges of defense against DDoS 
attacks are how to detect and identify the attack traffic 
accurately and efficiently. Detection system is part of access 
router or can belong to separate unit that interact with access 
router to detect attacks and identify attacks traffic. 
 
Edge  Router
Source Network
Target Network
Activate the
Filtering
Engine
Activate the
Rate Throttling
Eng ine
Do Nothing or
Stop the
Filtering/Rate
Throttling
Engine
Confirm a ttack Traffic
Suspicious attack Traffic
Attack detected
No Attack detected
Feature Extraction and Statistics
measure s gathering from Incoming
Traffic
Normal Traffic
Models
Matching
Engine
Updates the
Databases
Decision
Engine
Detection Engine
Bottleneck Link
 Router
Response Engine
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of proposed DDoS Defense Framework 
 
Detecting DDoS attacks involve first knowing normal traffic 
model of our system and then to find deviations from this 
normal traffic model. Our approach detects DDoS flooding 
attacks by monitoring the propagation of abrupt traffic 
changes inside the network. Two metrics/measures namely, 
Volume and Flow are used as parameter to obtained normal 
traffic model of our system. 
Detection 
Category  
Strategy  Used  NPSR       Complexity
      
Detection 
Accuracy   
Limitations      
Pattern 
Detection 
Store the signature of the known attacks in the databases 
and monitor each communication for the presence of these 
pattern  
High Low High Novel attacks detection is not 
possible 
Anomaly 
Detection 
Compare the current state of the system with normal 
system behavior periodically 
Medium Medium Medium High rate of false 
positive/negatives, as   normal 
system behavior and thresholds 
setting is difficult 
Third 
Party 
Detection 
Rely on an third party to signals the occurrence of attack Depend on 
detection approach 
used by third party 
High Depend on 
detection approach 
used by third party 
Economic Factor, Security 
prone 
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    Let *( )nX t normal traffic, indicating total bytes arriving at 
a target machine in ∆ time duration, assume that the target 
machine is intruded by DDoS attacks at ta. Generally target 
may not overwhelm immediately at ta. Assume attacker have 
attack traffic rate such that it overwhelmed target completely 
at tb, so target is unable to provide any service to its customer. 
Time duration (ta, tb) is known as transition period of attack. 
A good detection approach must have detection time td<tb, so 
the target may be avoided being overwhelmed completely. 
Let ( )inX t be the traffic during transition period (ta, tb), then 
we can express ( )inX t as follows: 
( )inX t = *( )nX t + ˆ ( )X t& ,                                (1)  
 
In equation (1) ˆ ( )X t&  is the component of the attack traffic. 
( )inX t - *( )nX t  using equation (1) can be used for detection 
purpose. Consider a random 
process{ ( ), , }X t t n n N= ∆ ∈ , where ∆ is a constant time 
interval, N is the set of positive integers, and for each t, X (t) 
is a random variable. Here X (t) represents the total volume 
in {t − ∆, t}. X (t) is calculated during time interval {t − ∆, t} 
as follows:  
1
( ) , 1, 2 ... .
N f
i
i
X t n i N f
=
= =∑ . Here ni  represent total number 
of bytes arrivals for a flow i in {t − ∆, t} and Nf represent 
total number of flows. We take average of X (t) and 
designate that as *( )nX t normal traffic Volume. Similarly 
value of flow measure is calculated and designates that 
as
*( )
n
F t . Here total bytes, not packets, are used to calculate 
volume metric, because it provides more accuracy, as 
different flows can contain packets of different sizes. 
    To detect the attack, the value of volume 
metric ( )inX t and flow metric ( )inF t is calculated in shorter 
time window ∆ continuously; whenever there is appreciable 
deviation from *( )nX t and *( )nF t , various types of attacks 
are detected using algorithm 1 as given in figure 3.  
 
Threshold values thξ and thς  are set as follows: 
*th Vrξ σ=                                                   (2) 
*th Frς σ=                                                   (3) 
 
In equations (2) and (3), Vσ  and Fσ represents value of 
standard deviation for volume and flow metrics, respectively. 
r I∈ , represent value of tolerance factor. Here, I is a set of 
integers. 
   Effectiveness of an anomaly based detection system highly 
depends on accuracy of threshold value settings. Inaccurate 
threshold values cause a large number of false positives 
(legitimate traffic can be classified as attack traffic) and false 
negatives (attack traffic can be classified as legitimate 
traffic). Various simulations are performed using different 
value of r. Then, trade-off between detection and false 
positive rate provides guidelines for selecting value of r for a 
particular simulation environment. 
 
Figure 3. Algorithm for Detection of Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack 
 
So, varying tolerance factor is used to accurately and 
dynamically settings of threshold value. Figure 4 shows our 
proposed DDoS attacks detection System. 
 
Do S/DDoS
Attack
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 Attacks
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Thres hold
Detector
Distance
De tector
Thres hold
Detector
( )inX t
* ( )nX t
( )inF t
* ( )nF t
ξ
thξ
thς
ς
Volume Measure
Flow Measure
Figure 4. Proposed DDoS attacks detection System 
 
3.2 Characterization of Malicious Flows  
After detecting that DDoS attacks are occurring, next thing 
to do is separating traffic coming through malicious flows 
from legitimate traffic to respond to attacks correctly. We 
observed number of bytes arrival for each flow during 
monitoring period, and flows that crosses predefined 
thresholds are classify either suspicious or attack traffic 
flows depending on deflection from thresholds. 
    Let F represent set of active flows. Then 
(
normal attackF F F= ∪ ) AND ( )normal attackF F φ∩ = , 
Where 
normalF  represent actual normal flows and attackF  
is set of actual attack flows. Characterization algorithm 
outputs subsets *
attackF , 
*
suspiciousF of F . Here, 
*
attackF  and 
 
Algorithm 1: DDoS attacks Detection Algorithm 
Input: *( )
n
X t , *( )
n
F t normal traffic Volume and Flow 
Metrics, respectively. thξ , thς  threshold value for Volume 
and Flow Metrics, respectively.  
Output: DDoS attack alert generation. 
  
Procedure: 
01: Consider a random process { ( )inX t , ( )inF t , t = n∆, 
n∈N}, where ∆ is a constant time interval, N is the set of 
positive integers, and for each t, ( )inX t and ( )inF t  are 
random variables. Here ( )inX t represents the volume 
metric, and ( )inF t  represents the flow metric in {t − ∆, t}. 
02: If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t ξ− > ) || ( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t ς− > ))  
DDoS attack alert is generated.  
03: Else If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t ξ− < ) && 
( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t ς− < )) 
No alert is generated. 
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*
suspiciousF  represent set of attack and malicious flows 
respectively, given by our characterization algorithm.  
Ideally 
* *( ) ( )
attack attack attack attack normalF F F AND F F φ∩ = ∩ =
and *( )suspicious normalF F φ∩ = AND *( )suspiciousF F⊂ . 
Six-sigma concept is used to calculate the Upper Control 
Limit (UCL) and Lower Control Limit (LCL) values in order 
to differentiate the normal, suspicious and attack state of the 
total number of bytes arrival for each flow. We use the 
subscript ‘ss’ to represent ‘suspicious state’ and ‘as’ to 
represent ‘attack state’.  
 
3.2.1 Six-Sigma method used to identify threshold 
values:  
 
 Six-Sigma, six standard deviations from the mean [12], [13], 
scheme is proposed by Motorola to address quality problem 
and business improvement. Six-Sigma means “a systematic 
innovative activity to statistically measure and analyze 
causes of defects that happen in all parts of management, and 
then remove those causes by identification of thresholds of 
the significant metrics which are measured with help of the 
data collected from the process”. Six-Sigma claims that 
focusing on reduction of variation will solve process and 
business problems. By using a set of statistical tools to 
understand the fluctuation of a process, management can 
begin to predict the expected outcome of that process. If the 
outcome is not satisfactory, associated tools can be used to 
further understand the elements influencing that process. 
Using Six-Sigma there would be approximately 3.4 or fewer 
failures per billion attempts. This is an extremely low rate of 
failure. It has been demonstrated that six sigma 
methodologies, integrated with rigorous statistics, can be 
flexible, powerful and successful without being either overly 
simplistic or inordinately cumbersome [42]. To find six-
sigma, calculate sigma or standard deviation, multiply by 6, 
and add or subtract the result to the calculated mean. 
   Hence to achieve extremely low false positive/negative, 
six-sigma method is used in our attack flows characterization 
approach to identify the threshold values. Theoretical control 
limits of UCL and LCL for suspicious state are represented 
as: 
   3
ss
UCL µ σ= +                              (4) 
    3ssUCL µ σ= −                                                    (5) 
 
In equations (4) and (5), UCLss represents a 3 x sigma 
upwards deviation from the mean value of a variable. LCLss 
represents a downwards 3 x sigma deviation from the mean 
value of a variable. For normally distributed output, 99.7% 
should fall between UCLss and LCLss. Theoretical control 
limits of UCL and LCL for attack state are represented as: 
    6asUCL µ σ= +                                (6) 
    6
as
UCL µ σ= −                                       (7) 
 
In equations (6) and (7), UCLas represents a 6 x sigma 
upwards deviation from the mean value of a variable and 
LCLas represents a downwards 6 x sigma deviation from the 
mean value of a variable. For normally distributed output, 
99.97% should fall between UCLas and LCLas. Here µ , σ  
represent mean and standard deviation of total bytes arrival 
for each flow, respectively, when attack is not occurring.  
      Here values greater than UCLas or smaller than LCLas are 
considered to be under attack state. The values between 
LCLss and UCLss are considered to be under normal state. 
Values between UCLas and UCLss or between LCLas and 
LCLss are considered to be under suspicious state. There can 
still be false positives and negatives due to flash crowd. To 
further reduce false positive negatives, flows that are active 
in previous time window are omitted from list of attack flows 
since we assume that all attack flows start at the same time.   
All the packets coming through flows *attackF  are filtered at 
edge routers. Rate throttling strategy is applied to packets 
coming through flows *suspiciousF . Rate of packets coming 
through flows *
suspiciousF  is throttled according to strength of 
attack. If incoming rate of attack traffic is high, packets 
coming through flows
s
F  are throttle with high rate and vice 
versa. 
 
4. Experimental Design and Performance 
Analysis 
We tested and evaluated proposed approach with monitoring 
data, which is generated in our testbed to confirm its 
effectiveness to detect variety of Distributed Denial of 
service attacks.  
 
4.1 Simulation Environment  
The simulation is carried out using NS2 [15] network 
simulator. At present, the Internet can be viewed as a 
collection of interconnected routing domains, which are 
groups of nodes under a common administration that share 
routing information. A primary characteristic of these 
domains is routing locality, in which the path between any 
two nodes in a domain remains entirely within the domain. 
Thus, each routing domain in the Internet can be classified as 
either a stub or transit domain [43], [44]. A domain is a stub 
domain if the path connecting nodes u and v passes through 
that domain and if either u or v is located in that domain. 
Transit domains do not have this restriction. The purpose of 
transit domains is to interconnect stub domains efficiently. 
So, real-world Internet type topologies generated using 
Transit-Stub model of GT-ITM [14] topology generator is 
used to test our proposed scheme, where transit domains are 
treated as different Internet Service Provider (ISP) i.e. 
Autonomous System (AS). Topology contains four transit 
domains with each domain contain twelve transit nodes i.e. 
transit routers. All the four transit domains have two peer 
links at transit nodes with adjacent transit domains. 
Remaining ten transit nodes are connected to ten stub 
domain, one stub domain per transit node. Stub domains are 
used to connect transit domains with customer domains, as 
each stub domain contains a customer domain with ten 
legitimate client machines. So total of four hundred 
legitimate client machines are used to generate background 
traffic. Total zombie machines range between 10 and 100 to 
generate attack traffic. Transit domain four contains the 
server machine to be attacked by zombie machines. A short 
scale simulation topology is shown in figure 5. 
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     The legitimate clients are TCP agents that request files of 
size 1 Mbps each with request inter-arrival times drawn from 
a Poisson distribution. The attackers are modeled by UDP 
agents. 
 
ISP  D om a in
Clien t  Ma ch ine
Router
Zombie M ach ine
Server
 
 
Figure 5.  A short scale simulation topology 
 
A UDP connection is used instead of a TCP one because in a 
practical attack flow, the attacker would normally never 
follow the basic rules of TCP, i.e. waiting for ACK packets 
before the next window of outstanding packets can be sent, 
etc. The attack traffic rate varies from 0.1 to 3.5 Mbps per 
attack daemon. The size of monitoring window affects the 
number of attack alert raised. In our experiments, the 
monitoring time window was set 200 ms, as the typical 
domestic Internet RTT is around 100 ms and the average 
global Internet RTT is 140 ms [45]. Using this value of 
monitoring window, total numbers of false positive alarms 
are minimum. False positive alarm number increases steadily 
with increasing monitoring window size. The simulations are 
repeated and different attack scenarios are compared by 
varying total number of zombie machines and at different 
attack strengths.  
    Figure 6 shows temporal variation of volume metric when 
(a) system is in normal condition, (b) under low rate DDoS 
attack and (c) under high rate DDoS attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Temporal variation of volume metric when system 
is in normal condition, under low rate DDoS attack, and 
under high rate DDoS attack 
 
DDoS attacks start at 25th second and end at 50th second. 400 
client machines are used to send TCP traffic. High rate attack 
is performed using 100 zombie machines with mean rate 
3Mbps per attacker. To perform low rate attack 100 zombie 
machines are used with mean rate 0.1Mbps per attacker. As 
shown in figure, it is clear that low rate attacks are nearly 
undetectable when using only volume as statistical measure. 
    For detection of low rate DDoS attack correctly with low 
false positive rate, flow metric is also considered along with 
volume metric. Figure 7 shows temporal variation of flow 
metric when (a) system is in normal condition, (b) under 
DDoS attack using 25, 50, 75 and 100 zombie machines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Temporal variation of Flow metric when system is 
in normal condition, and under DDoS attack using 25, 50, 75 
and 100 zombie machines 
 
It is clear from the figure 6 and figure 7, that low rate DDoS 
attacks perform using large number of zombie machines are 
also easily detected using both flow and volume metrics 
simultaneously.  
 
4.2 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
We have used three metrics to evaluate performance of our 
proposed DDoS detection approach, namely, detection rate 
(Rd), false positive alarm rate (Rfp), and receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC). The detection rate (Rd) is the measure 
of percentage of attacks detected among all actual attacks 
performed. The detection rate (Rd) is defined as follows: 
Rd =d/n                                                                    (8) 
 
Where d is the number of DDoS detected attacks, and n is 
the total number of actual attacks generated during the 
simulation. The false positive alarm rate (Rfp) is the measure 
of percentage of false positives among all normal traffic 
event defined as follows: 
Rfp =f/m                                                                   (9) 
 
Where f is the number of false positive alarm raised by 
attack detection mechanism, and n is the total number of 
normal traffic flow events during the simulation. The ROC 
curve is used to evaluate tradeoff between detection rate and 
false positive rate. 
 
4.3 Simulation Results and Discussion 
Figure 8 illustrates the variation of the detection and false 
positive rate with respect to different value of detection 
tolerance factor r, when DDoS is perform using different 
packet size. Detection rate is close to 100% with r <=6 and 
False positive alarm rate is <=2.9% with r >=6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Effect of detection tolerance factor on the 
detection and false positive rate 
 
Above result demonstrates that detection rate is very high 
with low false positive rate when r=6. The ROC curve in 
figure 9 explains the tradeoff between the detection rate and 
the false positive rate when DDoS is performing using 
7500000
7600000
7700000
7800000
7900000
8000000
8100000
8200000
8300000
8400000
8500000
8600000
8700000
8800000
8900000
9000000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Simulation Time (sec)
Vo
lu
m
e
Under Low Rate A ttack
Under High Rate attack
Normal
350
365
380
395
410
425
440
455
470
485
500
515
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Simulation Time (sec)
Fl
o
w
 
Under A ttack ( using 100
Zombie Machines)
Under A ttack (using 75
Zombie Machines)
Under A ttack (using 50
Zombie Machines)
Under A ttack (using 25
Zombie Machines)
Normal
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Detection Tolerance Factor
Detection Rate-attack packets size 1K bytes False Po sitive Rate-attack packets size 1K bytes
Detection Rate-attack packets size 512 bytes False Po sitive Rate-attack packet size 512 bytes
108                                                                                                                                                              Gupta, Misra and Joshi 
different packet size. Our detection scheme achieves a 
detection rate as high as 98.4% with 2.9% false positive rate. 
At detection rate 94.4%, false positive rate is very low 1.8%. 
So value of r is taken 6 in our approach. Value of r varies 
according to different simulation environments and correct 
value can be selected by drawing tradeoff between detection 
and false positive rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  ROC curve showing the tradeoff between the 
detection rate and false positive rate of DDoS attacks 
 
4.4 Comparison with VBA  
Comparison of detection performance of our proposed 
approach with VBA (Volume Based Approach) [31] DDoS 
attack detection system is reported below. VBA is 
implemented in our testbed. Following different DDoS attack 
scenarios are taken for comparison:  
 
4.4.1 Attack with high rate is performed by varying 
number of zombie machines 
 
To completely disrupt services provided by server machine 
or to high degradation of performance of sever machine, 
attack with high rate (300 Mbps) is performed by attacker. 
False positive rate is comparable in both the cases. Figure 10 
have shown the variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack is performed by varying total 
number of zombie machines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack with high rate is performed by 
varying number of zombie machines 
 
It is demonstrated by the figure that in this case detection 
results are comparable with more zombie machines, but 
when total number of zombie machines are less, our 
approach provide better detection rate compare to volume 
based approach.  
 
4.4.2 Attack with low rate is performed by varying total 
number of zombie machines 
 
To low degradation of performance of server machine, attack 
with low rate (10 Mbps) is performed by attacker. Figure 11 
have shown the variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack is performed by varying 
number of zombie machines. It is demonstrated by the figure 
that our detection system’s performance is far ahead and 
better than VBA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack with low rate is performed by 
varying number of zombie machines 
 
This is mainly due to the fact that in case of low rate 
degrading attacks the total arrived attack traffic does not 
exceed even normal fluctuation. But as we have considered 
total arrival flows too with arrival traffic, low rate degrading 
attacks are easily detected by our approach. 
 
4.4.3 Attack with varying attack rate is performed using 
fixed number of zombie machines 
 
Here we have considered varying attack rate using 100 
zombie machines to degrade performance of server machine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack with varying attack rate is 
performed using hundred zombie machines 
 
It is demonstrated by the figure 12 that in this our detection 
system’s performance if far ahead and better than VBA when 
attack strength is low. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
total arrived attack traffic does not exceed even normal 
fluctuation.  
 
4.4.4. Attack is performed when variation in both client 
and attack load 
 
Here we have considered the case when both client and 
attack load vary i.e. attack and client load is low, moderate 
and high. As shown in figure 13, it is clear that our detection 
system’s performance is far ahead and better than VBA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Variation of detection rate of VBA and our 
detection system when attack with low rate is performed by 
varying number of zombie machines 
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5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework that deals 
with the detection of variety of DDoS attacks i.e. high rate, 
low rate, mixed rate etc.; by monitoring the propagation of 
abrupt traffic changes inside ISP Domain and characterizes 
flows that carry attack traffic. Then its effectiveness is 
verified through intensive experiments on our testbed. We 
have shown by simulation results that, our novel framework 
can effectively detect and characterize various kinds of 
DDoS attacks with extremely high detection rate and with 
low false alarms rate. Although simulation results are 
promising, but in future work we plan to validate our 
approach, with real datasets. Investigation of an accurate 
strategy for response to identified attacks is also a future 
research issue. 
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